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by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
ROTH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Adam Ankele appeals the decision by the District Court granting
summary judgment for appellant Marcus Hambrick.  We will affirm.
I
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the District Court’s opinions.  We
briefly set forth only the most relevant facts here, in the light most favorable to Ankele. 
At around 4:00 p.m. on February 12, 2001, Ankele stopped at a bar to meet a friend. 
Between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., when he left, Ankele drank three ten-ounce glasses of
beer and ate nothing.  At around 6:30 p.m., driving home from the bar, Ankele crashed
into the rear of a car stopped at a red light.  He then drove his car into a nearby parking lot
and got out to inspect the damage and smoke a cigarette.  Michael Wieder, a bystander
3who had witnessed the accident, approached Ankele and asked if he was okay.  Based on
his observations of Ankele, Weider thought Ankele had been drinking.
As Ankele and Wieder spoke, Hambrick, a state trooper, arrived at the scene.  He
watched Wieder escort Ankele back to the scene of the accident and noticed that Ankele
was walking with a “staggered gait.”  Wieder noticed nothing unusual about the way
Ankele was walking, though he admitted that he was not paying attention to Ankele, but
rather watching for oncoming traffic.  Ankele concedes, however, that his wife has
described his natural gait as “goofy” or as “a limp.”
Hambrick first spoke with the driver of the other car, Robert Woods.  Hambrick
then approached Ankele, who at this point was standing by Hambrick’s cruiser, and asked
Ankele if he was the other driver involved in the accident.  Hambrick also smelled
alcohol on Ankele’s breath and noted his eyes appeared bloodshot.  Ankele, finding
Hambrick to be “a very intimidating person,” began backing away.  When Ankele
confirmed that he was the other driver and admitted that he had been drinking alcohol,
Hambrick immediately grabbed him, threw him onto the cruiser, emptied his pockets,
handcuffed him, and put him in the back of the police car.  Ankele did not argue with
Hambrick, though when Hambrick grabbed him, he did say, “What are you fucking
crazy?  I was just in an accident!”  Hambrick did not perform field sobriety tests before
arresting Ankele.
4Ankele was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), leaving the
scene of an accident, and driving at an unsafe speed.  When Hambrick and Ankele arrived
at the police station, Hambrick asked Ankele to submit to a “breathalyzer” test.  Ankele
complied and blew four or five samples.  After each sample, the machine printed a small
receipt.  When Ankele asked Hambrick what the readings had been, Hambrick responded
that the machine was not printing receipts.  Hambrick, however, threw the receipts into
the trash.  Hambrick then asked Ankele to sign a form stating that Ankele had refused to
submit to the breathalyzer test.  Ankele refused.  In all, Ankele was at the station for thirty
to forty-five minutes, twenty of which he spent waiting for his wife to pick him up.
A district justice later dismissed the charge of leaving the scene of an accident. 
Ankele also prevailed in his appeal of his license suspension.  Finally, after a trial, he was
found not guilty of DUI and driving at an unsafe speed.  Ankele then filed this action,
alleging false arrest, excessive use of force, and due process violations.  In a May 7, 2003,
decision, the District Court granted Hambrick’s summary judgment motion as to the
excessive force claim but denied it as to the false arrest and due process claims. 
Specifically, the District Court found that material issues of fact existed as to whether
Hambrick mistakenly but reasonably believed that his arrest of Ankele for DUI was
constitutionally permissible.  As to excessive force, the District Court concluded that
Hambrick’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances.  The
District Court found that Hambrick was absolutely immune from suit as to Ankele’s claim
5that Hambrick violated his due process rights by falsely testifying against him.  The court
also concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ankele,
Hambrick would not be entitled to qualified immunity for his destruction of exculpatory
breath-test evidence.
Ankele then amended his complaint, reasserting his false arrest claim, and adding
two malicious prosecution claims, one related to his license suspension, the other to the
alleged illegal arrest and destruction of evidence.  He did not reassert his excessive force
claim.  Hambrick, for his part, renewed his motion for summary judgment as to all of
Ankele’s claims, which the District Court granted in full.
II
Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  See Fed.
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003).  We
assess the record using the same summary judgment standard that guides district courts. 
See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  To prevail on a
motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Hambrick had probable cause to
arrest Ankele for DUI.  The undisputed facts show that Hambrick observed Ankele
walking across the street towards the scene of a serious accident, and that there was
     Because Hambrick had probable cause to arrest Ankele, we do not need to get into**
the issue of whether Hambrick destroyed evidence of the breathalyzer tests.
6
something unusual about Ankele’s gait.  Ankele then told Hambrick that he was the
driver of the car that was apparently at fault and that he had been drinking.  Based on this
undisputed evidence, probable cause existed to arrest Ankele for DUI.  Furthermore,
because Hambrick had probable cause to arrest, Ankele’s malicious prosecution claims
must also fail.  See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the criminal
proceeding was initiated without probable cause).**
Finally, we agree with the District Court that the force Hambrick applied in
arresting Ankele—specifically, grabbing Ankele, throwing him onto the police car, and
handcuffing him—was not excessive.  “Excessive force claims . . . are evaluated for
objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the conduct
occurred.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001).  In light of the facts and
circumstances confronting Hambrick, his decision to “slam[]” Ankele onto the hood of
the police car was not unreasonable.  Ankele admits that he was backing away from
Hambrick as Hambrick asked him if he were the other driver involved in the accident. 
Hambrick’s actions were not an unreasonable way to prevent Ankele from fleeing.  See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (instructing that a factor to be considered in
7the reasonableness inquiry is whether the suspect “is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight”).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
